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MAPP v. OHIO AND EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED BY PRIVATE PARTIES*
AN important constitutional decision often has an impact upon the course of
the law in subsequent cases that do not rise to constitutional dimensions. Un-
less the basis for a constitutional decision is clearly understood, however, its
inapplicability to slightly different factual situations may not be readily per-
ceived, for apparent similarities may tend to obscure more fundamental differ-
ences. The recent Supreme Court decision in Mapp v. Ohio 1 and the decision
of the New York courts in Sackler v. Sackler 2 provide an apt illustration,
Mapp held that the admission of evidence obtained by state police officers in a
manner proscribed by the fourth and fourteenth amendments constituted a
denial of due process of law.3 The lower court and the dissenting members of
the appellate court in Sackler found that the rationale of Mapp warranted a new
common law rule precluding the admission of evidence unlawfully seized by a
private litigant in a civil suit.4 To test the validity of this conclusion, an ex-
amination of the Mapp decision and its application to the unlawful seizure of
evidence by private parties for civil litigation is necessary.
It is received common law tradition that the manner of obtaining evidence
is not cause for its suppression in a civil or criminal proceeding.6 This com-
mon law doctrine admitting illegally obtained evidence rests on the proposi-
tion that evidentiary rules should not be manipulated to further policies that
are unrelated to the probity or truth-value of the evidence. 0 Nevertheless,
when it was felt necessary to effectuate an important extrinsic policy and the
policy to be furthered would be nullified if the evidence were heard in court,
the common law provided for exclusion of probative evidence.7 For example,
such policies as the preservation of the confidential relationship between hus-
*Sackler v. Sackler, 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct.), retd, 16 App. Div.
2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1962).
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224 N.Y.S. 2d 790 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.
2d 61 (1962).
3. 367U.S.643,655 (1961).
4. 33 Misc. 2d 600, 602, 224 N.Y.S. 2d 790, 792, read, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 427, 229
N.Y.S. 2d 61, 65,66 (1962).
5. Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 337 (1841) ; 4 JONES, EVIDENCE §
868 (5th ed. 1958) ; McCoRmcK, EviDENcE § 137 (1954) ; 8 WIGORE, EVIDENCE § 2183,
at 7 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Wigmore].
6. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter) ; Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933), 1 JoNEs, Evi-
DENCE IN CIVIL CASES § 1 (4th ed. 1938); 8 WIGoRE § 2175, at 3. See also 1 BENTHAM,
ATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 2 (1827). But see THAYER, EvIDnXcE AT THE COM-
moN LAW 264 (1898).
7. 8WIGmORE §§ 2175,2251.
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
band and wife,8 or attorney and client,9 or the preservation of state secrets 2 0
have long been deemed to be of sufficient importance to wrarrant impairing
the efficacy of the fact finding process. But this reasoning was not extended to
unconstitutionally or illegally seized evidence, either because the objective of
deterrence was not deemed to be of such importance as to warrant exclusion
or because punishment for socially undesirable behavior was not regarded as
one of the objectives of the law of evidence.'
Standing in marked contrast to this conmmon law tradition is the constitu-
tional doctrine excluding evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution
from criminal trials. The rule originated in Boyd v. United States12 and
Weeks v. United States,13 where it was applied to federal officers violating the
fourth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, reversing a prior decision,14 extended the
exclusionary rule to unconstitutionally obtained evidence sought to be in-
troduced in a state criminal trial. After the decisions in Weeks and Boyd, but
before Mapp, the Court in Burdeau v. McDowell 15 refused to exclude evi-
8. McConaniC, EvmFzcE § 82 (1954) ; MODE..L CODE OF EvrDFN.c rule 215, comment a
(1942).
9. See McConascy, EViDENCE § 91 (1954) ; Comment, Functional Overlap Between
the Lawyer and Other Professiontal: Its Implication for the Prhileged Communications
Doctrine, 71 YAI.u L.J. 1226, 1236-37 (1962). See generally 8 ,VIxGonz § 2291, at 545.
10. See, e.g., Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 Fed. 353 (E.D. Pa.
1912) ; 8 WiGuoaE § 2367. In some states confidential communications between physician
and patient are also immune. See McConancK, EvmzNcE § 101-08 (1954).
11. See State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 376-77, 259 S.W. 100, 108 (1924). But it was also
believed that in criminal cases, excluding illegally obtained evidence would provide an in-
adequate remedy for defendants who were innocent or whose guilt could be proven without
the illegally obtained evidence, and an inappropriate remedy for guilty defendants permitted
to escape punishment. Furthermore, it would fail to protect society from criminals left at
large. See, e.g., People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S.
657 (1926). See also Comment, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Se~iure, 58 YA.n
L.J. 144 (1948).
12. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Court, resting on the fourth and fifth amendments, in-
validated a statute authorizing courts to compel the defendant in a forfeiture proceeding to
produce papers specifically requested by the Government at the cost of having the allega-
tions as to such papers taken as admitted. The admission of evidence so procured vas
found to render the trial in which it occurred an "unconstitutional proceeding."
13. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks firmly established and generalized the rule, holding
that the defendant in any federal criminal proceeding could have evidence excluded by mak-
ing a pre-trial motion for the return of property unconstitutionally seized by federal officers.
Where possession is the basis for conviction in federal court, the motion to suppress un-
constitutionally secured evidence can be made by the defendant even if he had no property
or possessory interest in the evidence and thus was not a victim of the unconstitutional tak-
ing. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920), held copies or knowledge obtained from original documents illegally
seized by federal agents may not be used to support a federal criminal indictment.
14. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Wolf Court had found that the right to
be secure against arbitrary police invasions is the "core" of the fourth amendment and is
essential to the liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Nevertheless the state's conviction was sustained in Wolf because the exclusionary rule was
not considered part of the fourth amendment.
15. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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dence unlawfully obtained by a private person from a federal criminal prosecu-
tion, reasoning that a private person is not bound by the federal Constitution,
and since federal officers had not participated in the seizure, there was no
violation of the fourth amendment requiring exclusion.1 0 In so holding the
Court apparently heeded the fact that the exclusionary rule is bottomed on
remedying a constitutional violation and thus is inapplicable where the seizure
of the evidence does not constitute such a violation.17
Sackler may be distinguished from Burdcau on the ground that the public's
interest in criminal prosecutions was the gravamen of the decision in the
latter case,18 Thus, the trial judge in Sackler found that where a private person
seeks to further his own civil claims by the submission of unlawfully, albeit not
unconstitutionally, obtained evidence, exclusion is justified.19 The Sacklr
case arose when a husband seeking evidence of adultery in a suit for divorce
entered the apartment of his wife, from whom he was legally separated, and
photographed her and her alleged paramour in compromising circumstances. 0
f6. Id. at 475.
17. But see text accompanying notes 45 & 46 infra. Probably the only constitutional
ground upon which a state or federal court could be required to exclude such evidence in,
a private civil suit is that suggested by Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Judiclial
acceptance of evidence privately obtained by means which are constitutionally forbidden to
police might arguably be considered governmental action in violation of the fourth or four-
teenth amendments. Shelley held that a state court's injunction enforcing a private covenant
designed to discriminate against Negroes in the sale of certain real estate was state action
denying equal protection. Id. at 20. But neither post-Shelley Supreme Court action nor
policy considerations support a contention that the "state action" concept should be applied
to all judicial conduct which tends to encourage private behavior in which a state could not
constitutionally engage. See Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLumh. L. REv. 1083,
1108-20 (1960) ; Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. P"A. L. Rnv. 1, 13 (1959). In Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292
(1956), the Supreme Court found that the action of California's highest court sustaining
an employer's discharge of an employee for membership in the Communist Party presented
no federal question, although the dissent argued that affirmance of the California opinion
sanctioned "a flagrant violation, of the first amendment." Id. at 304. Since the Constitution
is not a mandate to private individuals, it would not seem to require that a court regulate
private conduct by granting a plaintiff relief solely on the ground that what the defendant
had done could not constitutionally be done by government. Even though a court's refusal
to interfere with a defendant's accomplished result may encourage private "misconduct" as
much as its enforcement of a plaintiff's attempt to accomplish such a result, only the latter
would seem to constitute state action.
18. See Judge Brenner's reasoning in Sackler v. Sackler, 33 Misc. 2d 600, 602, 224
N.Y.S. 2d 790, 794 (1962). Judge Brenner also stated that Elkins v. United States appeared
to have overruled Burdeau. Id. at 603, 224 N.Y.S. 2d at 793. In United States v. Elkins, 364
U.S. 206 (1960), the Court held that evidence seized by state officers in a manner which,
if seized by federal officers, would have violated the fourth amendment, must be excluded
in a federal criminal proceeding. But, despite the dictum of Williams v. United States, 282
F.2d 940, 941 (6th Cir. 1960), Elkins cannot be viewed as overruling Burdeaa when read
in light of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which made it clear that state police were
constitutionally restricted by at least the core of the fourth amendment; Burdeast held that
private persons could not violate the Constitution.
19. 33 Misc. 2d 600, 605, 224 N.Y.S. 2d 790, 795 (1962).
20. Id. at 604,224 N.Y.S. 2d at 794.
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On a pre-trial motion by Mrs. Sadder, the trial court ordered the evidence
suppressed, holding that Mr. Sadder's uninvited entry was "unreasonable"
within the meaning of the New York Civil Rights Law prohibiting unreason-
able searches and seizures.21 The statutory prohibition is identical with that of
the fourth amendment,2 2 but has been judicially construed to apply to private
individuals as well as public officials.m The trial court relied heavily on
Mapp v. Ohio, concluding that although the decision in that case did not re-
quire the exclusion of this evidence, its rationale could reasonably be extended
to suppress evidence illegally seized by private citizens in civil suits. 4 The
trial judge reasoned that since the Supreme Court had decreed that the sacri-
fice of some criminal prosecutions was not too great a price to pay for pro-
tection of constitutional rights, the sacrifice by an individual plaintiff of a
civil cause of action could reasonably be imposed to protect "the very same
rights" arising under the Civil Rights Law.25 He also noted that the few
civil and criminal sanctions available against trespassers in New York state
were likely to be as ineffective against an outraged husband as the sanctions
available in Mapp were against police misconduct.2 0 The majority of the ap-
pellate division rejected these arguments, holding that Mapp did not support
exclusion of evidence gathered by private persons, for "none of the reasons
given by the courts for excluding [illegally obtained evidence] in criminal
trials... applied to civil causes."27 Two dissenting judges, however, saw no
21. Id. at 604-05, 224 N.Y.S2d at ,94. Mr. Sadder made his early morning raid on
his wife's apartment with some friends who became witnesses to the circumstances found
there and whose testimony the defendant sought to suppress. The court found that Mr.
Sadder's entry was not made to prevent a crime or perform a citizen's arrest and was there-
fore "unreasonable... regardless of the illegality of such entry. It is the planned, deliberate
raid and search accomplished through an uninvited entry that makes the search unreason-
able and the fruits thereof should therefore be unacceptable in a court of law." Id. at 605,
225 N.Y.S. 2d at 795.
22. N.Y. CIvIL RIGHTs LAw § 8:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effect%
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated....
23. Sadder v. Sadder, 33 Misc. 2d 600, 603, 224 N.Y.S. 2d 790, 793, citing dictum of
Justice (then judge) Cardozo in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 588
cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
24. Sadder v. Sadder, 33 Misc. 2d 600, 601-02, 224 N.Y.S. 2d 790, 791-92 (1962).
25. Id. at 602, 224 N.Y.S. 2d at 792. The equation of the right to be free from private
invasion of privacy with the right to be free from governmental invasions of privacy vas
repeated by judge Hopkins in his dissent from the Appellate Division's reversal of Judge
Brenner's decision. 16 App. Div. 423, 429, 229 N.Y.S. 2d 61, 67.
26. Id. at 605, 224 N.Y.S. 2d at 795. The only state court precedent which Judge Bren-
ner found persuasive was Lebel v. Swincicd, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.V. 2d 281 (1958), in
which testimony based on a blood sample taken from the unconscious defendant was ex-
cluded from a wrongful death action because the taking was deemed a violation of de-
fendants right to be secure in his person which is protected by the Michigan Constitution,
arL 2 § 10.
27. 16 App. Div. 2d at 426, 229 N.Y.S. 2d at 64. The Appellate Division distinguished
the Lebel case from Sackler by the fact that the former involved a physical violation of the
person while the latter involved the violation of property rights. Id. at 427, 229 N.Y.S. 2d
at 65.
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grounds for distinction between the civil and criminal processes justifying the
existence of different rules.28 These opinions do not deal with the problem of
whether an exclusionary rule for private misconduct could be justified without
invoking the rationale of the federal rule. They seek, instead, to determine
whether or not the rationale used in Mapp v. Ohio supports an exclusionary
rule in private civil cases.
Mapp does not purport to decide whether admission of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence in a civil proceeding would also constitute a denial of due
process of law. Nor has' the question been clearly resolved by other federal
cages. Some early cases in which the exclusionary rule was applied suggested
that its basis was'not solely a fourth amendment right to be free from un-
reasoniable searches and seizures, but rather a right to be free from compulsory
self-incrimination arising out of the "intimate relationship" between the fourth
and fifth amendments.2 0 As Mr. Justice Bradley stated in Boyd, the case in
which the exclusionary rule was first formulated:
[The two amendments] throw light on each other. For the "unreason-
able searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are
almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evi-
dence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws
light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure"
within the meaning of .the Fourth Amendment."0
28. Id. at 427, 229 N.Y.S. 2d at 65 (Christ, J., dissenting) ; id. at 427, 229 N.Y.S. 2d
at 66 (Hopkins, J., dissenting). Judge Hopkins implied that the fourth amendment regulates
individual action as well as-government action. Id. at 431-32, 229 N.Y.S. 2d at 69-70.
29. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
30. Ibid. Relying on this theme, seveial cases have used the fifth amendment to "throw
light" on the meaning of the fourth Iamendment, and in so doing have limited the fourth
amendment's protection to the right of privacy. The first step was taken in Frank v. Mary-
land, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), where the Supreme Court upheld a fine imposed on a homeowner
for refusing to' admit a health ifispector.'Citing the eighteenth century case of Entiek v.
Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765), Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
majority, stressed the parallel historical development of the fourth and fifth to show that
the fourth amendmdrit had develoPed largely to protect people from police searches for
evidence to be used in criminal trials. 359 U.S. at 365. Thus a search without a warrant was
not an unreasonable"*search if made pursuant to a civil inspection ordinance because no
warrant was required. Id. at 373. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, strongly
criticized this narrow 'reading of the fourth amendment as based on inaccurate historical
analysis. Id. at 376. The'consequence of the Frank analysis can be seen in United States
v. Abel, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), where officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
in'puriuance of 'm adrministrative arrest preliminary to deportation, searched Abel's hotel
'i'oom and found items which were presented in 'evidence at his later criminal trial for conl-
spiracy to commit espionage. The Court upheld the use of the evidence, arguing that deporta-
tion proceedings, which are noncriminal, did not require stringent application of criminal
procedural safeguards; Id. at 230-31. Since the deportation arrest was pursuant to an ad-
ministrative warrant, it was "lawful"; therefore the Court could hold that the items in
question 'were seized asia'consequence of wholly lawful conduct." 362 U.S. at 2,10. The
anomalous re!ult 6f using the criminal-civil distinction iti this case is to obliterate a pro-
tection traditionalry'part of'the fourth amendment.
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Because the self incrimination provision was thought, at one time, to be avail-
able only in criminal cases,3 ' some courts limited the exclusionary remedy
to proceedings which could be considered criminal or quasi-criminal in na-
ture.32 Difficulties in applying the rule according to a civil-criminal dichotomy
arose from the problem inherent in making a meaningful distinction between
these two categories. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has held that "the
exclusion of evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure stands on a
different ground" from an unconstitutional seizure of goods to be forfeited,m
because the latter merely brings the res within the jurisdiction of the court
where the government's right to the goods may be determined, while the former
is used to determine that right.34 From this distinction, several courts have
developed a rule admitting unconstitutionally obtained goods to be forfeited, but
excluding evidence unconstitutionally seized, asserting, as did the Court in
Boyd, that a forfeiture is sufficiently criminal in nature to require the full pro-
tection of the fifth amendment, including the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.35 If the exclusionary rule were based on the "intimate relationship" be-
tween the fourth and fifth amendments, its application today would not depend
on the kind of proceeding--civil or criminal-in which it was invoked, since
the self-incrimination privilege may now be claimed by any party or witness in
a civil, criminal, or even administrative proceeding.30 Rather its application
31. See Corwin, The Supreme Court's Constructlion of the Self-Incriminotion Clause,
29 M Hc. L. Rv. 1,13-14, 195-196 (1931).
32. See, e.g., Bowles v. Beatrice Cieamery Co., 56 F. Supp. 805 (D. Wyo. 1944) (ex-
cluded evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of the constitution from a treble
damage action under the Emergency Price Control Act). Camden County Beverage Co. v.
Blair, 46 F2d 648, 650 (D.N.J. 1930) (court denied a bill in equity to restrain use of evidence
allegedly illegally seized by federal and state officers from use in investigation of plaintiff's
"worthiness" to hold a permit under the National Prohibition Act, on grounds that the
fourth and fifth amendments were intended to give protection against criminal prosecutions
and that they could not be invoked in the civil proceeding pending). United States v. Lee Hee,
53 F. 2d 681 (W.D.N.Y. 1931) (dictum to the effect that even if illegally procured, a
voluntary confession is admissible in deportation proceedings despite the fact that it would
not be in a criminal proceeding).
.33. Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926).
34. United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321, 325 (1926).
35. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938); United States v.
$4,171.00, 200 F. Supp. 28,30 (N.D. Ill. 1961) ; United States v. One 1950 Lincoln Two-Door
Hard-Top, 195 F. Supp. 205 (D. Mass. 1961) (evidence seized contrary to fourth amend-
meit excluded from forfeiture proceeding, while the car similarly obtained was allowed to
support the proceeding). See also United States v. Physic, 175 F. 2d 338 (2d Cir. 1949)
(evidence illegally obtained excluded with no mention of a constitutional violation having
been found) ; But see United States v. Plymouth Coupe 1941, 182 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1950)
(car seized unconstitutionally by federal officers held to preclude forfeiture proceeding) ;
United States v. One 1956 Ford Two-Door Sedan, 185 F. Supp. 76 (ED. Ky. 1960) (evi-
dence seized illegally by federal officers admitted, along with the car to be forfeited, on
grounds that the federal rule excluding such evidnce applied in criminal cases only).
36. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). This has been recognized by
several dourts who have refused to make a distinction between the application of the ex-
clusionary rule according to the civil or criminal nature of the proceeding in which it is in-
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would depend upon whether the evidence sought to be excluded could be con-
sidered incriminating, i.e., could reasonably be said to lead to a criminal prose-
cution.37 Under this rationale of the federal exclusionary rule, the fact that ex-
clusion was sought in Sackler in a civil divorce proceeding would not be deter-
minative since the evidence sought to be excluded could well lead to a subse-
quent criminal prosecution for adultery.38 However, the fifth amendment ration-
ale has not often been mentioned by the Supreme Court in its development of
the federal rule since the time of the Boyd case. 9 Thus it is not likly that the
rules governing the application of the privilege against self-incrimination con-
tinue to determine the circumstances in which the exclusionary rule may be
invoked.
The gravamen of the decision in Mapp seems to be a recognition that ex-
clusion is an essential fourth amendment remedy without which the constitu-
tional right of privacy would be nugatory.40 Thus the majority opinion em-
phasized the increasing recognition among jurists of the inadequacies of other
deterrents against unreasonable police searches,41 concluding that it had be-
come constitutionally necessary that the exclusionary doctrine be "insisted
upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf
case," (the right against arbitrary searches by state officials.) 42 If the function
of exclusion is deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures, rather than
the grant of a procedural safeguard for assuring a fair trial, the nature of the
proceeding in which the evidence is introduced would not seem to be relevant.
Therefore, it would seem that Mapp extends to civil as well as criminal pro-
ceedings.
yoked. In City of Chicago v. Lord, 3 Ill. App. 2d 410, 415, 122 N.E. 2d 439, 443, aff'd, 7
Ill. 2d 422, 122 N.E. 2d 438 (1954), the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that unless a
motion to suppress may be made in the first proceeding-civil or criminal-in which the
evidence unlawfully obtained is to be used, the constitutional protections would be rendered
meaningless. The court then applied Illinois' exclusionary rule in civil proceeding to en-
force a city ordinance. Similarly in Brown v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 52 F. Supp. 913
(S.D. Cal. 1943), re''d on other grounds sub nom. Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 146
F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 877 (1944), the federal district court granted
a motion to suppress evidence illegally obtained by agents of the Office of Price Administra-
tion and submitted in a civil treble damage action under the Emergency Price Control Act.
37. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
38. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 100, 101. Section 102 of the New York Penal Law provides
for punishment by imprisonment for not more than six months and/or a fine up to two
hundred and fifty dollars.
39. For example note its absence in the majority opinions in Week v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914), Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), and Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949). However, this reasoning was explicitly cited by Mr. Justice Black in his
concurring opinion in Mapp as a justification for abandoning his position in Wolf that the
constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches did not necessarily require exclusion of
the evidence. 367 U.S: 643, 661-62 (1960).
40. 367U.S. 643,655-56 (1960).
41. Id. at 651-53.
42. Id. at 656.
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Rationalized as a deterrent, 43 application of the exclusionary rule should be
related to the kind of conduct it is intended to prevent. Judge Brenner, the
trial judge in Sackler, apparently thought that the Supreme Court's engraft-
ing of an exclusionary rule on the constitutional prohibition against unreason-
able public searches and seizures provided support for engrafting an exclusion-
ary rule on any prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.4 4 But the
factor requiring the exclusionary rule does not seem to have been simply a
violation of a prohibition against unreasonable searches; rather it was the
fact that the misbehavior of government officials constituted an essential part of
such violations, whether statutory or constitutional.4r For instance, in McNabb
v. United States, the Supreme Court explicitly exercised its power to promul-
gate rules of criminal procedure, rather than its power to enforce the Constitu-
tion, to exclude a confession obtained by federal police who disregarded a con-
gressional statute requiring the accused to be formally arraigned within a cer-
tain time.46 Although the New York statute covers both public and private
misbehavior, the remedies required to deter the police misconduct prohibited
by the New York Civil Rights statute need not necessarily be attached to pre-
vent private misconduct simply because it falls under the same statute.
Unless privacy is considered some kind of absolute solitude of the individual,
police and private invasions of privacy cannot be viewed as violations of the
"very same right"4 7 The Jeffersonian ideal of limited government and more
recent abhorrence of totalitarianism have led to zealously guarded limitations
on the power of the state to interfere with the individual. Traditionally this
has meant the right of an individual to be free from intrusions by public
43. See the reasoning of the Court in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
44. This distinction is borne out in a series of cases before the National Labor Re-
lations Board. In the Matter of Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 49 (1946) (ex-
cluding evidence allegedly obtained unconstitutionally by board agents) ; In the Matter of
Andrew Jergens Co., 27 N.L.R-B. 521 (1940) (admitting evidence allegedly obtained illegal-
ly by agents of the union) ; Air Line Pilots Assoc., 97 N.L.ILB. 929 n.1 (1951) (admitting
privately seized evidence).
45. 318 U.S. 332 (1942).
46. Id. at 341. For another example of evidentiary exclusion based on statutory rather
than constitutional rights, see FFD. R Cam. P. 41 (e) giving a right to return of evidence il-
legally seized by federal officers. In addition § 605 of the Federal Communications Act 48
Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958), makes it a federal crime to divulge or publicize
information obtained by wiretaps) ; in Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), the
Court held § 605 required exclusion in federal criminal trials of evidence obtained by wire-
tapping, in effect overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), in which wire-
tap evidence obtained by federal officers contrary to a state statute but not unconstitutionally
was held admissible in a federal criminal trial. But in Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199
(1952), evidence obtained by state officials from a wiretap violating § 605 of the Federal
Communications Act was held admissible in a state criminal proceeding. See generally
MAGtmE, EviENuc OF GumlT (1959) ; Kamisar, Illegal Searches and Seisures and Con-
temporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Crininal Pro-
cedure, 1961 U. Ill. L. F. 78.
47. judges Brenner, Christ and Hopkins have so viewed the right of privacy in Sadder
v. Sacder, 33 Misc. 2d*600, 602 224 N.Y.S. 2d 790, 792; 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 431, 229
N.Y.S. 2d 61, 69 (1962).
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officials. The impact of an invasion by the state is heightened by the public
contempt aroused by the spectacle of government attempting to enforce cer-
tain rights by violating others.48 In the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis,
If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.49
The seriousness of this misconduct is indicated by the belief that when un-
checked, unconstitutional searches are not an occasional but a regular police
practice.50 It seems doubtful, even in the crowded conditions of twentieth cen-
tury life, that the right to be free of private invasions, such as Mr. Sackler's, is
as great a concern to society as the right to live beyond the arbitrary reach of
the state.
It may be however, that New York's application of its "unreasonable search
and seizure statute" to private individuals as well as public officials represents
that state's recognition of a right of absolute solitude and its refusal to differ-
entiate between public and private invasions of privacy. But before resort to
such an extreme measure as exclusion of evidence to deter such invasions, it
should be shown that less costly methods are inadequate. While criminal stat-
utes penalizing unauthorized entries into private homes apply to police officers
as well as to private citizens,51 it is widely recognized that police are rarely
prosecuted under such statutes.5 2 The victims of unconstitutional police be-
havior will seldom press criminal charges.5 3 The fear of subsequent police har-
assment may be a discouraging factor, especially if the victim is not tried and
imprisoned; if he is imprisoned, the procedural difficulties involved in pressing
charges make a suit almost impossible." Since prosecutors may have partici-
pated directly or indirectly in the wrong and generally have an interest in ob-
taining the cooperation and good will of the police, they are likely to be tolerant
of overzealous and even malicious law enforcement.5, Furthermore, a jury may
sympathize with, and be unwilling to sanction, policemen who it feels were
guilty of little more than an excess of fervor. This is especially true if, as is
48. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 912 (1955) ; State v. Owens, 302
Mo. 348, 376, 259 S.W. 100, 108 (1924). But see Herrscher v. State Bar of Cal., 4 Cal, 2d
399, 412, 49 P. 2d 832, 838 (1935).
49. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Brandeis).
50. See Specter, Mapp v. Ohio" Pandora's Problems For the Prosecutor 111 U. PA.
L. Rzv. 4-6 (1962). Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 Duxic L.
319 (1962).
51. See the state statutes listed in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 n,7 (1961), In ad-
dition there are criminal statutes explicitly prohibiting police misconduct. See, e.g., 62 Stat.
803 (1948), 18 U.S.C. 2236 (1958).
52. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961). See also People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
445, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955) ; Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual
Rights, 39 MINN.. L. REv. 493, 494 (1955) (dealing with the analogous situation of illegal
arrests).
53. MAGUIME, EVIDENCE OF GuiLT § 502 (1959).
54..Foote
, 
Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L.
Rzv. 493, 507-08 (1955).
55. Id. at 494-95.
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often the case, the officer presents a favorable image in contrast to the black-
guardly suspect.50 At the same time, it is not likely that civil damage suits by
the victims of official misconduct 57 provide much of a deterrent against police
misconduct. Aside from the presence of the same factors which inhibit victims
of police wrongs from pressing criminal charges, the nearly judgment-proof
status of policemen renders it unlikely that a significant recovery will result. s
While the same factors which make ordinary criminal and civil deterrents
against police trespasses ineffective do not operate in the case of private in-
trusions,59 other inhibiting factors may be present in the latter case; presum-
ably, if the deterrents presently available were completely effective, cases like
Sackler would not arise. Private trespassers may believe the prosecutor will
consider their infraction too minor to merit the institution of a criminal action
or they may calculate the gains from a civil suit to be more than the criminal
penalty imposed for breaking and entering. Similarly, a private trespasser might
hope to escape civil liability in excess of the sum he hopes to win because actual
damages of the trespass and search for which the victim can claim compensa-
tion are usually insignificant,60 and punitive damages may be avoided by "justi-
56. Id. at 500.
57. Wolf v. Colorado, 388 U.S. 25,42-44 (1949) (dissenting opinion of Justice Murphy);
Foote, supra note 53. Comment, Judicial Control of Illegal Search & Scire, 58 YALE L.J.
144, 151 (1948). But cf. Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). For a discussion of the
deterrent function of punitive damage awards see 2 HAuEaR & JAmEs, Toars § 25.1 (1956) ;
McCoRmIcK, DAmAGEs § 77 (1935); PaossEm, Toars § 2, at 9 (2d ed. 1955). See generally
Morris, Punitive Damtages in Tort Cases, 44 H~av. L. REv. 1173 (1931).
58. Foote, supra note 53, at 499.
59. The prosecutor would not be dissuaded from bringing an action by virtue of an
identification of interests with the law-breaker and the victim should have little reluctance
to press charges unless there is reason to fear private harassment. In addition, tort suits
against private law breakers seem more likely to result in substantial awards than those
against police. Compensatory awards for the physical damages and perhaps mental suf-
fering which resulted from the tortious method of obtaining evidence could be supplemented
by punitive damages which are imposed upon deliberate wrongdoers for the purpose of
punishing them and deterring others from committing similar wrongs.
For a discussion of damages awarded for mental distress as a result of invasions of
privacy see, e.g., Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 48Z 113 P2d 438 (1941) ; De-
velopments in the Law, Damnages-1935-1947, 61 H v. L. Rsv. 113, 139 (1947). See
generally 2 HARPER & JuEs, Toars §§ 9.1, 9.5-.7 (1956) ; McCoa~mcx, DAAGas § 77,
at 276-77 (1935). While punitive damages set by juries provide a more flexible tool than the
exclusionary rule whereby part of the community is allowed to weigh the circumstances of
each case and allot its sanctions accordingly, this remedy has often been criticized for pro-
viding too loose a standard and for being subject to many abuses. Morris, Punitive Damages
in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1179-80 (1930) ; Willis, Measure of Damages When
Property Is Wrongfully Taken by a Private Indtidual, 22 HARv. L. REv. 419 (1903).
Punitive damages have been found particularly necessary in cases where the tort-feasor
gains more from his tort than the amount of compensation to the plaintiff. Morris, mipra at
1185. Yet, in the situation where evidence is seized in the commission of a tort the gain is
obtained through the subsequent law suit and no cases have been found in which the amount
of a lost law suit were requested or awarded as proximately caused damages of a tort.
60. While actual damages from a trespass will always support a cause of action for
punitive damages, the majority view is that a suit for nominal damages will also suffice.
McCoasncx, DsAGT s § 83 (1935).
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fying" the search in the eyes of the jury by reference to the wrong for which
the evidence was sought. Although available sanctions for private trespasses may
not be wholly adequate to deter non-official invasions of privacy, since the
penalties imposed are not sufficient to remove the incentive to secure evidence
in all cases, nevertheless these sanctions seem more effective than those avail
able against police invasions of privacy.
In both cases the exclusionary rule operates as a wholly effective deterrent
against intrusions made to seize evidence because, by excluding the evidence
from court, the rule deprives the intruder of the benefit he had hoped to gain
-a chance of victory in his lawsuit.6' The effect is that the magnitude of
the penalty exacted by the rule is equated with the issue being tried, rather
than' the seriousness of the wrong committed by the party who seized the
evidence.
Applying such a varying penalty to the state may not be disturbing, since
the high standards imposed on official conduct often lead to procedural rules-
especially in criminal cases-in which certain kinds of misbehavior deprive
society of an opportunity for'an otherwise warranted conviction regardless of
the seriousness of the offense charged. 62 Emphasis on the necessity of proper
behavior by police and the necessity of strict adherence to fair procedures in
the criminal law afford a reasonable basis for a judgment that prevention of
police misbehavior is more important than any given conviction; this basis
seems lacking where private intrusions or individual civil suits are involved.
Furthermore, where a penalty has a direct effect on an individual,03 which is
not the case where society as a whole pays for "the constable's bungle,"0 4 the
importance of meting out fair treatment should counsel against the imposition
of varying penalties for the same offense.
Although the considerations underlying the federal exclusionary rule do not
appear to warrant its extension to cases of evidence unlawfully seized by
private persons dnd submitted in civil or criminal suits, the question of whether
an exclusionary rule to govern such cases is justified, independent of the
rationale of the federal exclusionary rule, remains.0 5 The formulation of an
61. It must be admitted, however, that an exclusionary rule would only deter future
private searches made by persons intending to find evidence and would not deter illegal
entries or searches in which evidence useful in a civil suit is found unwittingly. For an
appraisal of the deterrent effect of a state's adoption of the exclusionary rule, see Note, 9
STAN. L. REv. 515 (1957); Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Oblained by Illegal Search: A
Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 565, 588-92 (1955).
62, See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1947).
63. The exclusion of evidence has long been viewed as an addition to legislatively
prescribed penalties for individual misconduct. Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S.E. 624
(1897).
64. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657
(1926). See also Comment,.Jukicial Control of Illegal Search and Sciznre, 58 YALaE L.J. 144
(1948).
65. In the past, courts have independently developed procedural rules regulating a
tortious party's chances for successful litigation. The "clean hands" doctrine, applied by
equity courts, deprives the plaintiff of his alleged cause of action if he has obtained his
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exclusionary remedy to further the policies of the New York Civil Rights Act
may be objected to on the grounds that it is not a judicial function to add
remedies to those provided by the legislature for violations of statutory pre-
scriptions. But courts have long awarded civil remedies to individuals who fall
within the class of persons intended to be protected by such prescriptions-"
Thus, for example, violations of traffic laws have been found to be evidence
of negligence or per se negligence in tort actions. 7 Similarly the anti-fraud
provisions of the SEC statutes, which vest sole powers of enforcement in the
Commission, have been found to warrant relief to investors injured by viola-
tions of these provisions.68 Therefore it would seem the argument premised on
the maxim expressio unius ezclusio aIterius is as unpersuasive in the case of
remedies for violations of the New York Civil Rights Act as it is in these other
"right" by inequitable means. See 2 Pomaoy, E urry JumnspRauacE § 397 (5th ed.
1941). However, courts have placed "reasonable limitations" on the clean hands doctrine by
requiring that the plaintiff's hands be "clean" only in connection with the transaction upon
which his cause of action is based. See, e.g., Junkersfeld v. Bank of Manhattan Co., 250
App. Div. 646, 295 N.Y. Supp. 62 (1937). Similarly, the doctrine of equitable estoppel re-
quires that the wrongdoing plaintiff forfeit his cause of action only if his wrong is mis-
representation, knowingly made, upon which the defendant significantly relied to his det-
riment. Gregg v. Von Phul, 68 U.S. (8 WaiL) 274 (1863). In keeping with the "clean hands"
rationale. where a plaintiff fraudulently lures a defendant into a jurisdiction, the courts of
that jurisdiction often dismiss the plaintiff's claim. See, e.g., Wyman v. Newhouse 93 F2d
313 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Dunlap & Co. v. Cody, 31 Iowa 260 (1871) ; Abercrombie v. Abercrom-
bie, 64 Kan. 29, 67 Pac. 539 (1902). In criminal cases, however, where the state has forcibly
brought the defendant within its borders, the courts have recognized their power of jurisdic-
tion, thus arriving at an opposite result from that achieved'by the Weeks and McNabb
rulings. See, e.g., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (rejecting plea based on noncompliance
with extradition treaty and violation of U.S. Constitution); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S.
700 (1888) (rejecting plea based on extradition clause of the U.S. Constitution) ; Frisbie
v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952 (rejecting plea based on violation of Federal Kidnapping
Act). See Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 678 (1953) ; Scott, Critninal
Jurisdiction of a State Over a Defendant Based Upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud,
37 mx. L. REv. 91 (1953). These holdings can be criticized for their failure to use the
court's power of denial to deter police kidnappings as it has been used to deter unreasonable
searches and seizures. However, the rationale employed to justify the court's asserting its
jurisdiction over an illegally seized res in forfeiture proceedings may be applicable here. See
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Couch v. Steel, 3 F. & B. 402, 118 Eng. Rpt. 1193 (Q.B. 1854).
67. Although most statutes proscribing standards of conduct do not mention tort dam-
ages, courts in the past have implied a provision for civil liability and today the majority
of courts find a party's violation of a criminal statute negligence per se and the minority
regard such a violation as evidence of negligence to be weighed by the jury. Thus courts have
fashioned penalties which are imposed in the course of civil litigation for violations of
statutes which provide no civil remedies, See generally 2 HARPmR & .A.ns, Toms § 17.6
(1956) ; Morris, The Relation of Crihinal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HAav. L. REv. 453
(1933).
68. See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Fratt
v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631-33 (9th Cir. 1953) ; and see 2 Loss, SEcumTms rmuLA-
TioNs 938 (2d ed. 1961), 3 id. at 1763-71. See also Baird v. Franklin, 141 F2d 238 (2d
Cir.), cerL denied, 323 .U.S. 737 (1944) (Clark, J., dissenting).
19631 1073
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
situations. For the assumption in these other cases, that the legislature when
proscribing particular penalties rarely is aware of the question of private rem-
edies and therefore expresses no intent as to the inclusion or preclusion of such
remedies, would seem to be equally tenable in deciding whether to grant private
remedies under the New York Civil Rights Act. But precedent for this judicial
function does not necessarily warrant an exclusionary rule for violation of this
Act.69
The question of whether the exclusionary remedy should be prescribed by
the courts would seem to depend on the policy behind the Civil Rights Act,
the availibility of other remedies, and the impact of this particular form of
remedy on other legislative policies, such as those embodied in the New York
divorce laws. As construed by the New York courts, the New York Civil
Rights Act represents a legislative determination that invasions of privacy,
whether by police officials or private citizens, are equally reprehensible. This
policy would, of course, be furthered by the exclusion of evidence obtained
through a violation of the statute, just as the policy of traffic laws or the SEC
anti-fraud provisions is effectuated.by private damage suits. But the particular
form of the remedy here--exclusion rather than monetary damages-involves
other considerations absent from the SEC and ordinary tort cases. In grant-
ing monetary relief in the latter cases, the objective of compensation of the
person suffering injury from the violation of statutes determines the amount
of damages recovered in such actions. 70 Thus the amount of damages awarded
69. Admittedly, some rationalizations for the common law doctrine admitting illegally
secured evidence such as the avoidance of delay in trying the main issue, and the require-
ment of formal complaints of all issues to be tried may not be persuasive in, the light of
modern procedural reforms, especially discovery and counter claim. Liberal methods of dis-
covery are provided by Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which states that
upon a showing of good cause and notice to the other parties, any party to a pending action
may seek a court order requiring any other party to produce documents and tangible evi-
dence or to permit inspection of the same or of physical premises and property within hIls
control. The showing of good causes requires an affirmative showing that the thing sought
will aid the moving party in the preparation of his case, but it need not be shown that It
would be admissible evidence at trial. 4 MooRE, FEDSRAL PRACTICE §§ 34.08, 34.11 (2d ed.
1960). These broad discovery devices have been adopted by some states in their rules of
civil procedure and their availability would seem to greatly weaken any justificatiolv for
illegally obtaining evidence. When evidence could be obtained through legal means, its ex-
clusion from a civil suit followed by voluntary non-suit without prejudice would not result
in the loss of a chance to win the law suit which would otherwise result from exclusion.
Because courts are no longer adverse to trying more than one issue in a single proceedig
(see FED. R. Civ. P. 13b), even though they arise from separate sets of facts, the defendant
trespass-victim might enter a permissive counter claim in the same action for which evi-
dence was illegally sought if he'felt that the circumstances might render the jury partieu-
larly favorable to him. If not, the defendant-victim could request the court to use its dis-
cretion under Rule 42(b) -[FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b)] and allow him to assert his claim in a
separate trial. If at this trial, evidence of the outcome of the former suit were to be con-
sidered prejudicial by the court, the defendant might avoid jury bias in, obtaining compen-
sation for the trespass.
70. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104
(W.D. Ark. 1949) ; Appel v. Levine, 85 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ; cases cited in note
68 mupra. In the case of tort actions for statutory violations recoveries are not limited to
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is determined by the quantum of injury suffered by the victim. Where the
remedy takes the form of exclusion, however, the purpose of compensation
does not seem to be present, for it is difficult to characterize possible victory or
defeat in a lawsuit resulting from the unlawfully obtained evidence as the
injury suffered by the victim of the illegal search.7 ' Moreover, the severity
of the penalty imposed on the person seeking to introduce the evidence de-
pends upon the amount at stake in the lawsuit in which exclusion would for-
feit the plaintiff's cause of action or defendant's otherwise valid defense. Thus
the primary objection to this result is that it represents a sanction that does
not vary either with the offensiveness of the conduct or with the amount of
injury suffered by the person the statutory prohibition against unreasonable
searches seeks to protect. Finally, unlike private relief utilized to supplement
criminal or other statutory remedies, the exclusionary rule, because it increases
problems of proof at trial, may have the effect of thwarting other legislative
policies. In New York, for example, exclusion might indeed have such an effect
on the policy embodied in the divorce laws, which permit a divorce only on the
ground of adultery.72 Where there are alternative remedies, which vary in mag-
nitude according to the undesirability of the offending behavior or the damage
caused and which do not obstruct the attainment of other legislative policies,
employment of a penalty with such an arbitrary impact as that of a common
law exclusionary rule seems unwarranted.
compensatory damages if a case for punitive damages can be made out, but in theory at
least, this additional recovery is determined by the reprehensibility of the offender's conduct
and the amount of penalty necessary to deter such conduct. See note 58 supra.
71. Since the law suit is instituted to "right" a previous wrong which may or may not
have taken place in fact, recovery in that suit may not legally be said to result from the
introduction of evidence which attests to the factual existence of the wrong, although ad-
mission of the evidence may be a factual "but for" cause of recovery.
72. N.Y. Civ. P. Acr. § 1147. See also N.Y. Do. Rr. LAw § 7 & 7a.
Moreover, by compounding the problems of proof inherent in these cases, the effect of
the exclusionary rule in the Sackler situation would probably be to render extremely diffi-
cult, if not to preclude, a great many divorce suits in New York.
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